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В статье показана роль информационного превосходства в достижении геополитических 
целей, рассмотрены этапы противостояния государств и их коалиций. Обоснована важность 
опережения противоборствующей стороны в выполнении разведывательных задач. На основе 
военно-системного анализа начального конфликтного противостояния, характеризующего 
высшую степень напряженности и дальнейшего развития этого противоборства, определены 
основные направления совершенствования систем разведки.
Ключевые слова: информационное превосходство, строгий конфликт.
Information superiority of the Russian Federation Armed Forces (RF AF) over a potential 
opponent is considered as one of fundamental factors in the achieving of the final goal – defeat of the 
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opponent’s armed forces or refusal of their military-political administration to further implement their 
plans on the beneficial for the AF of Russian Federation terms. Each of the branches and arms of the 
RF AF in accordance with current plans plays the most active role in accomplishing certain tasks to 
achieve the information superiority over the opposing force. The process of gaining the information 
superiority itself is thoroughly enough connected with the stages of opposition of the states (allies), 
where the most important ones are [1,2]:
1. Origin of opposition (resulting from economic, territorial, ideological, disagreements in the 
military sphere and actions of the contestants).
2. Forming the alliance of like-minded states and denial of making similar alliances to the 
opposing state (or taking measures to destroy the already formed alliance of states).
3. Intelligence intensification (in the political, economic, military, scientific area) of the opposing 
state and its satellites.
4. Preparation and persistent influence on the world community by representing the opposing 
state as an aggressor posing a real threat to the world.
5. Gaining the approval from the UN to begin the military aggression against the opposing state 
(opposing coalitions of states) or preventing the opposing state from gaining such an approval.
6. Hampering (dissolution of) the activity of state and military administration on the whole 
territory of the opposing state (alliance of states).
7. Conducting information and psychological offensive operations against the opposing states 
and their Armed Forces taking into account different layers of population, political and religious 
patterns, level of media and telecommunications development.
8. Fire damage and electronic destruction of state and military control systems (notification 
systems).
9. Destruction of air defense capabilities as well as the means of counter strike and launch under 
attack, including those that pose the threat to friendly information assets.
10. Defeat of the opposing states’ Armed Forces and forcing the military and political leaders to 
surrender.
11. Representation of the convincing information to world community that prove the conducted 
military operations were extremely needed and timely. Forming and presenting the base of 
evidence.
The struggle for information superiority will be conducted within the framework of specific 
operations and actions, where information-technical and information disseminating facilities of 
different hierarchical levels will be applied [1,2].
The struggle for information superiority is a complex information conflict, in which the opponents, 
besides the reconnaissance activities, will engage the objectives to hamper or impede their application, 
while taking measures to ensure unimpeded performance of friendly information assets. 
Information confrontation is the information contest which intends to provide a full-scale 
destructive effect on information, information systems and information infrastructure of the opposing 
force and simultaneous protection of friendly information, information systems and information 
infrastructure from the similar effect [3].
Consequently, the information confrontation may involve offensive and defensive actions in the 
information conflict. Generally speaking, the information confrontation can be regarded as a set of 
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components, where the information conflict (as part of Information Warfare) and the information 
support are considered to be the primary elements.
The modern stage of the information support development is characterized by dramatic changes 
in maintenance of functional actions, structure of the information support system as well as methods 
(forms) of information support of the Armed Forces during the implementation of different tasks in 
war and peace.
One of the main components of the information support is the reconnaissance system, which is 
primarily developed to form the necessary potential in the information confrontation. The latter is 
being constantly improved, and special emphasis is laid on its accuracy, authenticity and operational 
efficiency; overtaking the opposing side in this aspect is crucial. To gain this objective the joint ground, 
air and spatial reconnaissance units establish multi-fold, and at the same time interrelated centers to 
collect, process and disseminate information. Such centers provide necessary intelligence data to the 
military leaders of different levels, and provide effective operation of the airborne reconnaissance and 
fire weapons systems.
Maintaining the superiority in the information support requires constant and comprehensive 
consideration of reconnaissance capabilities of the developed states and generation of reasonable 
ways of reconnaissance systems further development. To date the US leaders complete the second 
fundamental modernization of collection, processing and dissemination information system. 
Improvements are being made to increase operational efficiency, authenticity, and accuracy of the 
intelligence information. To gain this objective the joint structure of the operating systems and unified 
software is developed, the procedures of data submission and logging are utilized. It, in turn, allowed 
for critical advance in automatic performance and eliminating the negative impact of subjectivity 
in the intelligence data assessment. The USA military leaders believe that the complete deployment 
of the perspective information support systems will be in agreement with the main regulations of 
the Network-centric Warfare. Within the framework of the reconnaissance systems upgrading the 
procedure of intelligence data analysis is taking place. It includes:
– development and application of fast-acting algorithms of processing signals obtained from 
different sensors, secondary and tertiary information processing through unified mathematical 
approach and absolute languages; 
– development and application of integrated formats of data submission and logging;
– tailoring the existent collection, processing and dissemination information systems to the growing 
information network space and to combat capabilities in the consolidated information area;
– development of hi-tech means and methods of data submission to the consumer whenever it is 
need, displaying the zones of ambiguity;
– establishing the direct communications and intelligence transmission channels to send data 
immediately to the fire assets and Electronic Warfare means; 
– providing the required level of co-operation through establishing the users’ access to optical-
electronic, radiolocation, Electronic Support Measures and other types of data, as well as 
through the building-up a unified situational awareness; 
– increase of data flow control effectiveness.
The advance in forms and methods of reconnaissance provides for [4 – 8] further combination 
and integration of all reconnaissance means into the consolidated system with the effective leadership 
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techniques. It should be noted that the modern stage of development in the military reconnaissance 
system elements is characterized by distinctive conflict-system approach to their further perfection. 
Thus, special attention is paid to the systems of information support of battle actions of Russian 
Federation of the developed states to maintain national security at the necessary level.
In this connection, urgent development of the information support systems, both for the state 
and its Armed Forces, is becoming of primary importance. As a matter of experience, battle actions 
in the Persian Gulf, on the Balkans and lately in the Near East [2], there is a tendency in research 
plans and designers’ work conducted by the developed states to upgrade reconnaissance technique. 
The distinctive feature of the plan is that scientific-technical reconnaissance units, founded here, 
accomplish the primary tasks to gain information about different states achievements in the area of 
upgrading reconnaissance, integrated technical monitoring, Electronic Counter-counter measures. 
Moreover, much attention is paid to the problems of forecasting and simulation of one’s own Armed 
Forces information support capabilities in military conflicts of different nature and intensity. This 
proves the ambition of the developed states to achieve insured information superiority above potential 
opponents in any potential situations and on all stages of opposition (origin of conflict, beginning 
of conflict actions, intensification of tension, crisis, beginning of combat actions, renewal of neutral 
military relations (peace recovery)). It is well-proven [6], that rational behavior is a condition under 
which a party will join the information confrontation only if it is certain to achieve the information 
superiority. It is considered that the parte having lost the information confrontation will be long unable 
to amend this condition. The identical situation is expected in case of the armed conflict. The party 
joins the armed conflict only if there is information superiority over the opponent during the whole 
period of confrontation with the relatively equal munitions.
Lately there is a steady tendency of tailoring the conventional weapons and Electronic Warfare 
facilities and systems to solve the problems of the information confrontation, including the development 
of specific weaponry to use in information conflicts. At the heart of its design is:
– the most advanced information support systems;
– rapid highly-accurate delivery;
– operational highly-reliable integrated monitoring.
In spite of the above-mentioned, the achievement of information superiority will be also pursued 
through the use of conventional airborne highly-precision weaponry which is being upgraded and 
updated according to the following aspects: 
– improvement of the precision-guided munitions’ (PGM) features (increase of range, increase 
in the number of simultaneously hit targets, increase the effectiveness of target location and 
selection equipment; 
– reduction of signatures level of PGM as well as of its delivery vehicles by means of reducing 
their electromagnetic radiation, application of passive guidance systems, reducing the effective 
radar cross-section of both PGM and its delivery vehicles in radar operation and optical range 
frequencies;
– reduction of dependence between efficient PGM guidance and natural and deliberate jamming 
effects by means of new principles of anti-jam protection techniques, integration of sensors 
performing in different spectral ranges with automated navigation systems, application of spe-
cial algorithms of the desired signal processing;
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– integration of reconnaissance and engagement facilities, systems development to search for, 
control and destroy information objectives with PGM.
The ways to improve PGM according to the mentioned above aspects include [8 – 10]:
– wide use of multi-unit and multispectral optical sensors, modern element base for the digital 
signal processing, special types of sounding pulses (encoded signal, in particular);
– application of moving-target indicator cancellers and noise protection circuits on the basis of 
joint analysis of time-response and spatiospectral characteristics of the desired signals; 
– increased structural selectiveness (through the development of the basic and alternative sur-
veillance, aiming and targeting channels);
– computerization of search, location and identification;
– increase of the optical-electronic systems anti-jam capability due to space and time covering 
warning channels, which prevent unauthorized disclosure of powerful radiation sources;
– use of special principles and algorithms of signals reception based on amplitude-phase ef-
fects;
– use of the effective optical systems, designed on the basis of the latest technological achieve-
ments which provide high frequency and spatial selectivity.
The main feature of the new generation PGM, based on the information support system 
achievements, which has a profound value, is the system-level principle of complex neutralization 
of opponent’s activities. The latter is achieved by means of consistent application both the means to 
increase the stealth and anti-jam capabilities and special countermeasures, denying the opponents 
counter operation. It ensures the effectiveness of the perspective information support systems and PGM 
guidance systems in case of potential opponents’ interference into their performance, and, ultimately, 
creates favorable conditions to achieve the goal despite the hindrance of the opponent forces, which is 
the characteristic of conflict stability. The high conflict stability of the perspective information support 
systems, PGM in general and PGM control systems in particular distinguishes them from the radio 
electronic munitions legacy system [6].
The experience of weapons system application in local wars and armed conflicts [2] allows the 
following conclusions:
1. Each opposing party rapidly develops its weapons system, striving to attain maximum results 
before combat actions begin (during peace-time and active information confrontation).
2. Any modern weapons system contains offensive and defensive subsystems. Each subsystem is 
multifunctional and used both for strikes and counter-strikes delivery.
3. The structure of the modern weapons system is flexible as the updated computer-aided control 
systems provide efficient structures under the changing conditions of confrontation.
Offensive weaponry update level is characterized by retaining C4I systems in operational mode 
(including all major defensive facilities) and counter capability to the multidimensional attack. The 
level of offensive weapons updating is characterized by the striking ground and aerospace systems 
capabilities so that the opposing party is unable to strike back.
Considering the bilateral antagonistic conflict, both opponents may be characterized by the level 
of weapons system development:
1. The party is not ready to deal with a massive strike, neither they are ready to deliver a massive 
strike (C1).
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2. The party is ready to deal with a massive strike, but they are ready to deliver a massive strike 
(C2).
3. The party is not ready to deal with a massive strike, but they are ready to deliver a launch under 
attack (C3).
4. The party is not ready to deal with a massive strike, neither they are ready to deliver a preventive 
strike (C4).
5. The party is ready to deal with a massive strike, and they are ready to deliver a launch under 
attack (C5).
6. The party is ready to deal with a massive strike, and they are ready to deliver a preventive strike 
(C6).
The defense readiness alert for a massive strike according to [7] is thought of as a friendly 
defense capability of more than 65% from the initial quantity with the certainty value of 0,99 under the 
conditions of the PGM massive strike simultaneous delivery to destroy the opposing force defense in 
depth. This index of defense effectiveness should be solely concerned with defense system capabilities 
without taking into consideration massive strike facilities of the opposing force at the moment of 
launch under attack and preventive strike delivery.
The state of opposing parties will be characterized by exhaustive events:
5. The party is ready to deal with a massive strike, and they are ready to deliver a launch 
under attack (C5). 
6. The party is ready to deal with a massive strike, and they are ready to deliver a preventive 
strike (C6). 
The defense readiness alert for a massive strike according to [7] is thought of as a friendly 
defense capability of more than 65% from the initial quantity with the certainty value of 0,99 under 
the conditions of the PGM massive strike simultaneous delivery to destroy the opposing force 
defense in depth. This index of defense effectiveness should be solely concerned with defense 
system capabilities without taking into consideration massive strike facilities of the opposing force 
at the moment of launch under attack and preventive strike delivery. 
The state f opposing parties will b  haracterized by exhaustive events: 
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characterized Qij , the information subsystem requirements are determined by the necessary primary 
index of party ‘a’ over party ‘b,’ information subsystem features of party ‘b’ including perspectives of 
its development, and the signatures level of the AF objectives and troops activities. One of the variants 
showing the conflict development state in the form of state space trajectory, taking into account the 
initial conflict state, is shown in Fig. 1.
The conflict development dynamics is employed in various forms and different ways of 
confrontation. In general, verbal models of conflict development can be represented in the following 
way.
One of the parties, using the pre-mission intelligence (collected during peacetime), prepares and 
delivers a massive strike at the AF objectives, including the reconnaissance facilities of the other part. 
The efficiency of the strike will depend on the following:
– authenticity of the intelligence collected during peace-time;
– reconnaissance mobility potential of the opposing force, dealing with the strike, and its anti-
jamming capabilities;
– combat reaction time of the attacker (time elapsed from the reconnaissance mission completion 
to the strike delivery).
In this case the control of strike delivery efficiency can be carried out through the use of General 
Reconnaissance facilities. The strike delivery management of this type is performed according to the 
principle of surprise attack at the soft targets. The effectiveness of protection depends on military 
intelligence support and the facilities which provide protection as a result of the reconnaissance 
information. Besides, the defending part will strive to deliver a retaliatory blow or a launch under attack. 
The damage effect of these attacks is determined by the quantity of the secured means of destruction, 
survivability of C4I system, as well as availability and accuracy of the intelligence concerned with 
the opposing force at the strike delivery time. A special point in the confrontation is the intention of 
the defending party to deliver a launch under attack, i.e. before the PGM impact on the attacked AF 
objectives. However, the damage incidence to the attacked party can be significant, and in case of the 
massive strike it substantially increases. To decrease the damage incidence inflicted on the defending 
party, two ways can be considered:
Fig. 1. State space trajectory of opposing forces conflict
state is characterized Qij , the information subsystem requirements are determined by the necessary 
primary index of party ‘a’ over party ‘b,’ i formation su system features of party ‘b’ including 
perspectives of its development, and the signatures level of the AF objectives and troops activities. 
One of the variants showing the conflict development state in the form of state space trajectory, 
taking into account the initial conflict state, is shown in Fig. 1. 
 
Fig. 1. State s ace traj ct ry of opposing forces conflict 
The conflict development dynamics is employed in various forms and different ways of 
confrontation. In general, verbal models of conflict development can be represented in the 
following way. 
One of the parties, using the pre-mission intelligence (collected during peacetime), prepares 
and delivers a massive strike at the AF objectives, including the reconnaissance facilities of the 
other part. The efficiency of the strike will depend on the following: 
- authenticity of the intelligence collected during peace-time; 
- reconnaissance mobility potential of the opposing force, dealing with the strike, and its 
anti-jamming capabilities; 
- combat reaction time of the attacker (time elapsed from the reconnaissance mission 
completion to the strike delivery). 
In this case the control of strike delivery efficiency can be carried out through the use of 
General Reconnaissance facilities. The strike delivery management of this type is performed 
according to the principle of surprise attack at the soft targets. The effectiveness of protection 
depends on military intelligence support and the facilities which provide protection as a result of the 
reconnaissance information. Besides, the defending part will strive to deliver a retaliatory blow or a 
launch under attack. The damage effect of these attacks is determined by the quantity of the secured 
means of destruction, survivability of C4I system, as well as availability and accuracy of the 
intelligence concerned with the opposing force at the strike delivery time. A special point in the 









Gennady V. Zibrov. The Analysis of Modern Information and Fire Conflict Distinctive Features
– providing high-performance system of integrated AF defense which eliminates the possibility 
of significant damage to the defending party;
– delivery of launch under attack by the defending party, which prevents strike delivery before 
their combat employment by the opposing force.
These ways are not mutually exclusive and can be realized in full to ensure the AF objectives’ 
defense in various military-political situations, where the efficiency of the above considered suggestions 
may vary.
The climax of information confrontation is when one of the opposing parties is ready to 
deliver a massive strike at the AF of the other party, which, in its turn, is ready to deliver a 
launch under attack. Furthermore, each party is ready to defend friendly AF from the massive 
strike, and through the reconnaissance subsystems seeks to detect the most advantageous time to 
enable a massive strike delivery. The high tension of confrontation is determined by far-reaching 
implications both in case of delay and being too early before the opposing party starts their activity. 
A delay in the actions causes the opposing part to overcome the complex protection system (its 
suppression or destruction) and deliver highly-efficient massive strike. Being too early may result 
in that not all objects subject to the attack can be detected and destroyed at the first massive strike. 
In addition, the considerable period of time in stealing a march may cause the disclosure of control 
and destruction facilities which allows for more precise massive strike delivery by the opposing 
part.
Negative consequences may also include the change of the attitude to the attacking party: because 
of the too early actions it can move to the aggressor status (according to the international norms), which 
causes aggravation of the international situation and mobilization of international community to deter 
the ‘aggressor.’ Such a situation can be arranged purposely, inducing the opposing party for the activity 
which as a whole is aggressive in its nature. 
Thus, the conducted military-system analysis of the reference state of opposing forces formed 
during information and fire conflicts allows for the following conclusions. 
The change in modern forms and methods of combat gives rise to the primary role of information 
superiority over the opposing force. One of basic elements for achieving such superiority is the 
information support realized through the corresponding reconnaissance system. 
Reconnaissance systems efficiency, in turn, is realized by reducing military signatures in all 
spheres of general and operational reconnaissance to the state which makes opponent’s effective 
reconnaissance application impossible in zones, located beyond the reach of friendly reconnaissance 
systems. 
The estimation of goals achievement success in the information-fire conflict can be acquired by 
means of methodical framework and information conflict models, which deal with opposing parties 
as strictly antagonistic. The resulting estimations depend on initial conditions that emphasize the 
necessity of continuous information support of the Armed Forces accomplishing different missions 
during peace-time.
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